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PERSONAL BANKRUPTCY AND
CREDIT SUPPLY AND DEMAND
ABSTRAC T
This paper examines how personal bankruptcy and bankruptcy exemptions affect the supply
and demand for credit. While generous state-level bankruptcy exemptions are probably viewed by
most policymakers as benefiting less-well-off borrowers, our results using data from the 1983
Survey of Consumer Finances suggest they increase the amount of credit held by high-asset
households and reduce the availability and amount of credit to low-asset households, conditioning
on observable characteristics. We also find evidence that interest rates on automobile loans for low-
asset households are higher in high exemption states. Thus, bankruptcy exemptions redistribute
credit toward borrowers with high assets.
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Ann Arbor, MI 48109-1220Over the last decade, increasing numbers of individuals and married couples have filed for
personal bankruptcy in the United States. In 1983 (the year of our data set), there were 313,000
personal bankruptcy filings. An upper bound estimate of the resulting loss to creditors that year was
about $12.5 billion (1983) dollars.l Since 1983, the number of personal bankruptcy filings per year
has risen steadily and it peaked in 1992 at 900,000. In total over the decade 1983-1992, about
5,300,000 individuals or married couples filed for bankruptcy, which implies that nearly 6 percent of
U. S. households experienced a personal bankruptcy filing during this period.z
Households that file for personal bankruptcy under Chapter 7 of the United States Bankruptcy
Code are required to give up any assets that exceed the applic~ble, state-specific exemption levels,
are not required to devote any of their fiture income to debt repayment. In return for giving up
non-exempt assets, they receive a discharge from most types of debt. Thus, even households with
but
both high income and high assets can avoid repaying their debts in bankruptcy as long m their assets
are below the applicable exemption level. Debtors can ofien increase their financial benefit from
bankruptcy by shifting assets from non-exempt to exempt categories before filing.
Personal bankruptcy law became much more favorable to debtors following the passage of the
Bankruptcy Reform Act of 1978 (BRA78). Prior to 1978, bankruptcy exemptions were specified by
the states and tended to be very low. The Commission on the Bankruptcy Laws of the United States
‘This figure equals the number of personal bankruptcy filings in 1983 times the mean debt level in
Sullivan, Warren and Westbrook’s [1989, p. 64] sample of personal bankruptcy filings, which was
$38,000 in 1981 dollars or $41,600 in 1983 dollars. The estimate is an upper bound because it assumes
that no debt is repaid in bankruptcy. In practice about one percent is repaid in bankruptcy [White, 1987;
Sullivan, Warren and Westbrook, 1989, Chapter 12].
‘The figure of 5,300,000 is overstated to the extent that debtors have made repeat bankruptcy filings.
According to Sullivan, Warren and Westbrook [1989], the repeat rate is about 8 percent. Since 1992, the
number of bankruptcy filings has fallen slightly. Data on number of personal bankruptcy filings and
number of U. S. households are taken from Statistical Abstract of the U, S. 1994, tables 865 and 65.
1[1973] argued that a high and uniform bankruptcy exemption would be beneficial to less-well-off
households. The argument was that with the rise of the consumer credit industry and its aggressive
advertising and sales techniques, households tended to accumulate substantial debt but little savings,
and therefore were vulnerable to unexpected events such as illness, layoff, or wives quitting work due
to pregnancy. Given harsh collection practices by creditors, debtor households ofien found it difficult
to recover from these setbacks and would suffer firther adverse consequences such as ill health, family
strain, divorce, and job loss, unless a generous exemption in bankruptcy Iefi them with adequate assets
for a “fresh start.” Thus the Commission advocated the adoption of a high and uniform Federal
bankruptcy exemption on the grounds that it would help households whose financial situation was
marginal before bankruptcy and who would otherwise have difficulty recovering from financial
setbacks
While the House adopted the Commission’s populist view, the Senate preferred to continue
allowing the states to set their own bankruptcy exemptions.3 In a compromise, the BRA78 specified a
uniform bankruptcy exemption of $7,500 for equity in “homesteads” (owner-occupied principal
residences) and $4,000 for non-homestead property, with the exemption values doubled when married
couples filed for bankruptcy. However, the Act permitted states to opt out of the Federal exemption
by adopting their own bankruptcy exemptions. By 1983, all states had done so, although 12 allowed
debtors to choose between the state and the Federal bankruptcy exemptions. Many states raised their
bankruptcy exemptions when they passed opt-out legislation, but they adopted widely varying
exemption levels.4 At the two extremes, Iowa’s exemption as of 1983 was $500 for homestead equity
and $5,000 for non-homestead property, while Texas’ exemption was unlimited for homestead equity
3Commission on the Bankruptcy Laws of the United States [1973] and House of Representatives Report
[1977].
‘See Duncan [198 1] for discussion of the legislative history of the Bankruptcy Reform Act and of the
opt-out legislation adopted by Nebraska.
2and $30,000 for non-homestead property (see below).
Because U. S. households tend to have few financial assets and are not required to use their
incomes to repay debt in bankruptcy, more households could benefit financially by filing for
bankruptcy than actually file.’ In
attractive by doubling the Federal
addition, Congress recently made filing for bankruptcy even more
bankruptcy exemption.G This suggests that in the future, the practice
of fiIing for personal bankruptcy could become much more common as households become
increasingly knowledgeable about the bankruptcy system. But despite the importance of personal
bankruptcy, the subject has been almost completely neglected by economists.
In this paper we begin to address the issue of how personal bankruptcy and the bankruptcy
exemption affect credit markets. Bankruptcy exemptions are likely to affect both the supply and
demand for credit. As the bankruptcy exemption rises, debtors are more likely to file for bankruptcy
and repay less in bankruptcy, holding other factors constant. Also the bankruptcy exemption provides
partial wealth insurance and the higher the exemption level, the greater the insurance coverage. Even
when lenders raise interest rates to offset increases in the exemption level, greater wealth insurance
makes risk averse debtors better off and causes their demand for credit to rise. But higher bankruptcy
exemptions also reduce the amount that creditors receive in repayment of debt and may make them
more likely to refuse to lend in the first place. Thus, higher bankruptcy exemptions are predicted to
reduce credit supply. We estimate a model of the effect of bankruptcy exemptions on credit supply
and demand, using data from the 1983 Survey OJConsumer Finances and information on bankruptcy
exemptions in each state.
We find that state personal bankruptcy exemptions have a significant, positive effect on the
5White and Petropolous [1996] estimate that between 15 and 50 percent of U. S. households would
benefit financial] y from filing for bankruptcy as of 1992, with the range depending on what strategies
households are assumed to pursue before tiling in order to increase their financial benefit from bankruptcy.
‘This provision was part of the Bankruptcy Reform Act of 1994.
3probability that households will be turned down for credit or discouraged from borrowing. We also
find that the amount of debt held by households in the top half of the asset distribution is positively
related to state bankruptcy exemptions, suggesting that high-asset households have higher demand for
credit in high-exemption states. Households with large amounts of assets have the most to gain fi-om
generous bankruptcy exemptions, hence it is these households for whom we would expect demand
effects to be greatest. This result is reversed for households in the lowest quartile of the asset
distribution, where the amount of debt held is negatively related to the level of the bankruptcy
exemption. For these households, supply effects appear to dominate and lenders either deny credit
completely or loan smaller amounts. This raises the possibility that low-income households in states
with high exemptions receive less credit than otherwise equivalent borrowers in states with low
exemptions. We also present evidence that interest rates on automobile loans are higher for low-asset
households in states with higher bankruptcy exemptions than they are in states with low exemptions.
Thus, while generous state-level bankruptcy exemptions are probably viewed by most policymakers as
benefiting less-well-off borrowers, our results suggest they increase the amount of credit held by high-
asset households and reduce the availability of credit to low-asset households, i.e., they redistribute
credit toward borrowers with high assets.
I. Background Literature
Previous empirical papers on personal bankruptcy have focussed on the effect of the BRA78 on
the number of filings over time. Shepard [1984], Peterson and Aoki [1984], and Boyes and Faith
[1986] find evidence that the BRA78 increased the number of bankruptcy filings relative to what
would be predicted based on time series patterns prior to 1978, but Domowitz and Eovaldi [1993] find
that the BRA78 had no effect, Boyes and Faith also suggest that risky borrowers may have been
excluded from the credit market by BRA78. White [1987] found that the number of Chapter 7
bankruptcy filings in 1981 was positively and significantly correlated with the level of the state
4bankruptcy exemption.’
There is a large theoretical literature on credit markets with asymmetric information that explores
when credit rationing occurs, how it is reduced by borrowers pledging collateral, and whether low-risk
or high-risk borrowers are affected when credit rationing occurs.s Because these models assume that
borrowers are corporations rather than individuals, they do not consider the role of bankruptcy
exemptions on credit markets because there is no equivalent of the bankruptcy exemption for
corporations in bankruptcy.g
II. Legal and Institutional Background
When debtors file under Chapter 7 of the U. S. Bankruptcy Code, they receive a discharge from
unsecured debt in return for giving up assets in excess of the relevant state’s bankruptcy exemption.
Several provisions of the Bankruptcy Code prevent debtors from waiving their right to benefit from
the Chapter 7 bankruptcy exemption and hence make it impossible to use private contracts as a means
of voiding statutory bankruptcy exemptions. Creditors may not enforce claims against debtors’ assets
if the assets are covered by the Chapter 7 bankruptcy exemption. This provision prevents creditors
from taking a blanket security interest in all of debtors’ possessions. 10 Creditors can only enforce
‘Also see Luckett [1988] for an overview of economic aspects of personal bankruptcy; Sullivan,
Warren, and Westbrook [1989] for discussion of the characteristics of a sample of bankruptcy filers from
the early 1980s; and White [1991] for discussion of sociological versus economic approaches to
bankruptcy. Paxson [1986], using a sample of households from 1951, 1957, 1962, and 1967, provides
evidence that state laws such as interest rate ceilings can affect credit market behavior, but she does not
examine bankruptcy provisions.
‘See Bester [1985, 1994], Besanko and Thakor [1987], and Boot, Thakor and Udell [1991].
9Another strand of the literature on credit markets with asymmetric information derives from Stiglitz
and Weiss [198 1]. In their model, lenders cannot observe the riskiness of the investment project that
borrowers engage in. They show that changes in the interest rate alter the riskiness of the pool of
borrowers, which causes lenders to deny loans to some borrowers and to charge less than the market
clearing interest rate. Mankiw [1986] explores a similar model of the student loan market and emphasizes
that a small increase in lenders’ opportunity cost of funds may cause the loan market to collapse.
’011 U.S.C. $$ 522(e) and (f).secured claims against debtors’ assets if creditors provided the money to finance a particular asset’s
purchase. (See below for further discussion of Chapter 7 bankruptcy exemptions).
There is a second U. S. personal bankruptcy procedure, Chapter 13 of the U. S. Bankruptcy
Code, and debtors may not waive their right to choose between Chapters 7 and 13.” Under Chapter
13 bankruptcy, debtors are not obliged to give up any assets, but they must propose a plan to repay a
portion of their debts from future income over several years. Debtors have an incentive to choose
Chapter 7 rather than Chapter 13 whenever their assets are less than the bankruptcy exemption, since
doing so allows them to avoid repaying debt horn either assets or future income. Because many
states’ exemption levels are high relative to the assets of typical households that file for bankruptcy,
around 70 percent of all personal bankruptcy filings occur under Chapter 7 [White 1987]. Even when
households file under Chapter 13, the amount that they are willing to repay is strongly affected by the
Chapter 7 bankruptcy exemption. For example, suppose a household with assets of $20,000 living in
a state whose exemption level is $10,000 considers filing for bankruptcy. Because the household
would have to give up $10,000 in assets if it filed under Chapter 7, it would be willing to pay
creditors no more than $10,000 (in present value) from future income if it filed under Chapter 13. As
a result of this close relationship between Chapter 7 and Chapter 13 bankruptcy filings, we ignore the
distinction between them. 12
‘‘11 U.S.C. $ 706(a) provides that cases filed under Chapter 7 may not be converted to Chapter 13
unless the debtor requests such a conversion. In 1986, an amendment to the Bankruptcy Code (11 U.S.C. $
707(b)) was adopted that allows bankruptcy judges to dismiss Chapter 7 personal bankruptcy tilings if
discharge of debt would be a “substantial abuse” of Chapter 7. However this provision was not in effect
during 1983, the year of our data set, and in any case has rarely been used.
‘zOther reasons why debtors might choose to file for bankruptcy under Chapter 13 are that certain types
of debts, such as those incurred by fraud, are dischargeable only under Chapter 13. In some Bankruptcy
Courts, judges encourage debtors to file under Chapter 13 and this leads to many plans being filed that call
for only token repayment of debt. Another reason that debtors sometimes file under Chapter 13 is that
they have filed under Chapter 7 within the past few years. Debtors who file under Chapter 7 are barred
from filing again for 6 years, but there is no limit on the number of filings allowed under Chapter 13. See
Elias, Renauer, and Leonard [1993].
6Household debt can be divided into secured and unsecured loans. Secured loans include
mortgages, home equity lines of credit and automobile loans. These loans allow lenders the right to
foreclose on the house or repossess the automobile if the debtor defaults, regardless of whether the
debtor files for bankruptcy. Unsecured loans include credit card and other consumer loans. When
debtors file for bankruptcy, they are only obligated to repay unsecured loans if they have assets that
exceed the exemption level and are not subject to creditors’ Iiens.
Unsecured loans would seem more likely to be affected by bankruptcy exemptions than secured
loans. In practice, however, the distinction is blurred and households are ofien able to arbitrage assets
and debts across categories and thereby increase their financial benefit from bankruptcy. For example,
debtors might borrow on their credit cards or obtain new consumer loans in order to reduce their
mortgage debt. These transactions convert non-dischargeable secured debt into unsecured debt that is
dischargeable in bankruptcy. Or debtors might sell personal property that is in excess of the personal
property exemption and use the proceeds to reduce their mortgages or to buy exempt property. 13 In
addition, bankruptcy undermines the value of collateral to lenders, since lenders may be delayed in
repossessing it or may be unable to repossess it at all. Lenders also incur extra legal costs because
they must obtain the permission of the bankruptcy trustee in order to repossess collateral. For these
reasons we examine the effects of bankruptcy exemptions on total debt, rather than distinguishing
between secured and unsecured debt.
While debtors may arbitrage assets and debts across categories, in the empirical work that
follows, we assume that debtors do not make interstate moves before filing for bankruptcy. For
typical debtors contemplating bankruptcy, the cost of such moves are prohibitive, since moving usually
‘]Debtors may have to wait 90 days before filing for bankruptcy if they use these strategies, since the
transfers may otherwise be considered “preferences” that the bankruptcy trustee can set aside. 11 U.S.C. $$
547(b),(c)(7). Debtors may also conceal assets or transfer them to relatives, but if discovered, there is a
small risk their bankruptcy filings may be dismissed on grounds of fraud.
7requires paying a moving company in cash and making a cash deposit to a new landlord, in addition to
leaving friends and family and finding a new job. For affluent debtors, these costs are less prohibitive
and there have been some well-publicized cases of debtors moving to states that have unlimited
homestead exemptions. 14 But the practice is uncommon because of transactions costs and the fact that




and Leonard 1993, p. 2/21].
IV. Empirical Hypotheses
period 1 consumers borrow some amount B at interest rate r. Consumers’ period 2
Wz,is unknown as of period 1 but is distributed according to the distribution fl~z).
The overal 1bankruptcy exemption in the borrower’s state of residence is denoted E, where we assume
that assets are fungible across categories. In period 2, the loans come due, consumers learn their
period 2 wealth, and they must decide whether to repay the debt in full or default and file for personal
bankruptcy. If consumers file for bankruptcy, their obligation to repay the loan depends on their
wealth. They are obliged to repay nothing if Wzs E and to repay an amount Wz - E if
E < Wz <E+B(l +r). If wealth Wz exceeds E+B(l +r), then consumers must repay their debts in fill
and cannot benefit by filing for bankruptcy. Borrowers therefore benefit financially from filing for
bankruptcy whenever their wealth WJ turns out to be below E +B(I +r),15
Borrowers’ period 2 wealth distribution can be divided into three regions of no repayment (a),
‘“For example, Martin Siegel, an investment banker, purchased a $3.25 million dollar home in Florida
when investors filed a civil lawsuit against him demanding $2.75 million in damages. See “Rich Debtors
Finding Shelter Under a Populist Florida Law,” New York Times, July 25, 1993.
‘sWealth W2 and the distribution of wealth flWz) are resumed to be measured afier debtors have
pursued any strategies that they use to conceal or reduce their wealth before filing for bankruptcy (moral
hazard).
8partial repayment (b), and fill repayment (c), as shown in figure I. The level of the bankruptcy
exemption affects the sizes of the three repayment regions. A higher exemption causes the boundaries
between regions (a) and (b) and regions (b) and (c) to shifi to the right. Thus, as E rises, the
probability that debtors file for bankruptcy and repay nothing rises and the probability that they avoid
bankruptcy and repay in full falls. Also, debtors repay an amount WZ-E if their period 2 wealth falls
into region (b), so that they repay less as E rises.
If the exemption rises, lenders will raise the interest rate. Suppose the interest rate rises enough
that expected repayments remain the same. Bankruptcy provides borrowers with partial wealth
insurance. If borrowers are risk averse, an increase in the exemption raises expected utility because
the amount of insurance has increased. When borrowers’ period 2 wealth falls into region (b), the
exemption increase raises their wealth, which makes them better off. When borrowers fall into region
(c), the increase in the interest rate that offsets the exemption increase lowers their wealth, which
makes them worse off. But these changes make borrowers better off ex-ante, since the wealth increase
occurs when their marginal utility of wealth is high and the wealth decrease occurs when their
marginal utility of wealth is low. Thus a higher exemption level in bankruptcy makes risk averse
borrowers better off, which increases their demand for loans. The hypothesis that demand for loans
rises with the bankruptcy exemption is examined below. ‘c
An increase in the interest rate that fully offsets the increase in the default rate when the
exemption level rises must leave
unaffected as long as lenders are
lenders equally well off. In this case, the supply of loans would be
risk neutral. But if borrowers are heterogeneous, it may become
“Creditors may not be able to raise interest rates enough to offset the effect of the increase in the
bankruptcy exemption. In this case they may stop lending-completely or, if they can distinguish among
borrowers, ration loans to the least credit-worthy. Rea [1984] and Dye [1986] discuss the insurance effect
of bankruptcy exemptions.
9worthwhile for lenders to adjust the supply of credit in response to changes in the exemption level.
As an example, suppose some borrowers are opportunists, while others are not. Assume that it is
too costly for lenders to attempt to distinguish between types when borrowers apply for loans.
Opportunistic borrowers file for bankruptcy whenever their period 2 wealth falls into regions (a) or
(b) in figure I. In contrast, non-opportunistic borrowers file for bankruptcy only if illness or job loss
occurs and their period 2 wealth falls into regions (a) and (b). A rise in the bankruptcy exemption,
therefore, increases the probability that opportunistic debtors will fiIe for bankruptcy by more than it
increases the probability that non-opportunistic debtors file for bankruptcy.’7 The increase in the
exemption level may make it worthwhile for lenders to invest in efforts to identi~ opportunistic
borrowers in advance. Thus, as the exemption level rises, lenders may devote more resources to
checking potential borrowers’ credit histories and, as a result, they may be more likely to turn down
loan applicants. The hypothesis that otherwise similar borrowers are more likely to be turned down
for credit in states with higher exemption levels is also examined below. In addition, increased losses
from opportunistic behavior by borrowers in high exemption states may cause lenders to reduce the
amount they lend or charge higher interest rates to otherwise similar borrowers in these states. We
cannot directly identi~ credit demand and supply, but we examine whether the negative effect of a
high exemption on the supply of credit is larger or smaller than the positive effect of a high exemption
on the demand for credit. We also examine whether lenders charge higher interest rates in high-
exemption states.
V. Data, Identification, and Descriptive Evidence
We use data from the 1983 Survey of Consumer Finances (SCF) to examine the empirical
“For simplicity we assume that the probability of illness or job loss occurring is less than perfectly
correlated with the period 2 wealth distribution.
10hypotheses. 1’ For a sample of 3,706 households, the SCF gives detailed information on the types and
amounts of credit held by households, their assets, sources of income, demographic characteristics,
credit market experience, and state of residence. 19
We supplement the 1983 SCF with information on states’ bankruptcy exemptions in 1983. Most
states have separate exemptions for equity in homesteads, equity in motor vehicles, personal property,
tools of the trade, the cash value of life insurance and pensions, household goods and clothing, and a
miscellaneous (“wildcard”) catego~. Some states allow debtors to choose be~een the state’s
exemption and the (uniform) Federal exemption, while the rest require that the state’s exemptions be
used. Some states also allow married couples who file for bankruptcy to double the exemptions.
Table I lists the homestead exemption and the combined value of the personal property, tools of the
trade, automobile and wildcard exemptions in each state in 1983.20 The table also indicates whether
each state allows its residents to use the Federal bankruptcy exemption (listed at the end of the table)
and whether the state allows married couples to double the exemption.
The exemption values vary widely across states and there appears to be no strong geographic
pattem.21 Seven states have unlimited homestead exemptions, while three states and the District of
Columbia have zero homestead exemptions (although they allow their residents to use the Federal
“See Avery and Elliehausen [1988] for details about the data and Juster and Kuester [1991]; Curtin,
Juster, and Morgan [1989]; and Avery, Elliehausen, and Kennickell [1988] for a discussion of the 1983
SCF’S good data quality.
“Later SCFS do not identify state of residence, so we are unable to use them for this paper. The 1983
SCF includes data on a subsample of high-income households, but because state of residence is not
provided for this group, we drop these households.
‘“We exclude the pension and life insurance exemptions because in many cmes they involve specific
conditions, such as requiring that the insurance only benefit dependents. We also exclude the exemption
for household goods and clothing since it is generally not subject to a dollar limitation.
2’Exemptions change infrequently, which increases our confidence in treating the cross-state variation in
exemptions as exogenous to credit market behavior.
11exemptions). The combined value of non-homestead exemptions range from $0 in Connecticut to
$30,000 in Texas and is unlimited in two states.
For each household in the SCF, we compute a value for the homestead plus non-homestead
exemptions in bankruptcy. Because assets are fungible, for the empirical work below we combine
exemptions.z2 The overall exemption is assumed to be unlimited if either the homestead or
non-homestead exemption in the relevant state is unIimited. If the state allows its residents to choose
between the state or the Federal exemption, then households are resumed to choose whichever
exemption is greater. We also double the exemption if the SCF household is married and the relevant
state allows doubling for married couples.
The SCF contains a set of questions that ask whether respondents have been turned down for
credit in the three years prior to the survey or whether they were discouraged from applying to borrow
because they thought they would be turned down, While it is common in the literature to interpret
these questions as indicating that a borrower is credit constrained (see, for example, Jappelli [1990]),
people could, in principal, be turned down because they asked for inappropriately large amounts of
credit. Cox and Jappelli [1993] and Duca and Rosenthal [1993], however, show that the observed
level of credit for SCF households who were turned down or discouraged from borrowing is roughly
$10,000 lower on average than would be predicted, where the predictions come from a selection model
of credit demand estimated using the characteristics of the sub-sample of households who were not
turned down or discouraged from borrowing. This result supports the idea that SCF households who
were turned down or discouraged from borrowing are in fact constrained by credit supply (also see
Perraudin and Sorensen [1992]). These questions allow us to examine the empirical hypothesis that
borrowers in high-exemption states are more likely to be turned down for loans than observationally
22 Elias, Renauer, and Leonard [1993, p. 2/20] gives this advice on asset substitution: “If you have an
asset that is not exempt, you may want to sell it before you file for bankruptcy. You can use the proceeds
to buy exempt property.”
12equivalent borrowers in low-exemption states.
For households that are not supply constrained, observed levels of credit reflect some mix of
supply factors, which should decrease the amount of credit made available to borrowers in high-
exemption states, and demand factors, which should increase the amount of credit held by borrowers
in high-exemption states. Thus, an increase in the bankruptcy exemption will have an ambiguous a
priori effect on the amount of debt held by unconstrained households. However, if we observe that
unconstrained households in high-exemption states hold more debt than households in low-exemption
states, controlling for other characteristics, then we can infer that higher bankruptcy exemptions
stimulate demand for credit. Thus, the SCF data on debt held by households can be used to make
inferences about the effects of bankruptcy exemptions on demand for credit. Additionally, this
discussion implies that credit should be more expensive in states with high exemptions.
Two figures help illustrate our hypotheses. Figure 11plots the probability of being turned down
for credit or discouraged from borrowing afier we split the sample into bankruptcy exemption quartiles
and asset quartiles.23 Households with “low” exemptions are in the bottom quartile of the combined
exemption distribution. Households with “unlimited” exemptions are located in states that have either
an unlimited homestead exemption or an unlimited non-homestead exemption. In each of the asset
quartiles, households in unlimited-exemption states are more likely to be turned down for credit than
are households in low-exemption states. The increased probability of being turned down or
23The combined bankruptcy variable is discrete, hence the “quartiles” include uneven shares of the
population. The first quartile (up to $12,700) includes 27.1 percent of the population, the second (up to
$25,400) includes 31.5 percent and the third (up to $70,400) includes 22.7 percent of the population. The
remaining households live in states with unlimited exemptions (the top quartile, equalling 18.7 percent of
the population), We refer to this breakdown as quartiles throughout the rest of the paper. The results are
not sensitive to alternative, sensible specifications of the exemption variable.
Total assets are composed of financial and real assets. Financial assets are the sum of checking
accounts, money market accounts, saving accounts, IRAs and Keoghs, CD’s, saving bonds, bonds, stocks,
mutual funds, and trust accounts. Real assets are net equity in the home plus net equity in other assets
such as cars and art work. The quartile breakpoints for the total asset distribution are $7,855, $48,535, and
$109,637.
13discouraged from borrowing in a unlimited-exemption state ranges from 1.2 percentage points in the
bottom quartile of the asset distribution to 8.7 percentage points (or 54 percent) in the second quartile.
The effect of the bankruptcy exemption on households’ demand for credit should depend
nonlinearly on assets. To illustrate, suppose the bankruptcy exemption in a state increases to $40,000
from $30,000. This change should increase the demand for credit by a household having $35,ooo in
assets, since the increase in the exemption level lowers the household’s expected cost of borrowing,
but it would have little or no effect on the demand for credit by a household having $10,000 in assets.
In the extreme case of households that will never have assets, the bankruptcy exemption will not affect
demand for credit because there is (and will be) nothing for these households to shelter in bankruptcy.
Figure III graphs median total debt against quartiles of the distribution of total assets and the
bankruptcy exemption. The figure shows the importance of accounting for potential nonlinearities in
the asset-exemption relationship. For households in the bottom half of the asset distribution, median
holdings of debt change little across exemption levels. For households in the top half of the asset
distribution, median holdings of debt generally increase with the size of the exemption (although the
relationship is not monotonic).
The figures display patterns that are consistent with the empirical hypotheses. The probability of
being turned down for credit or discouraged from borrowing is positively related to the bankruptcy
exelnption within asset quartiles. Households in the top half of the asset distribution in states with
high exemptions appear to have stronger demand for credit than their counterparts in states with low
exemptions. We measure the size, significance, and robustness of these effects, conditioning on other
characteristics, in the following section.
VI. Regression Analysis
Our first hypothesis is that the higher a state’s bankruptcy exemption, the more likely that lenders
turn down credit applicants or that applicants will be discouraged from borrowing. We examine this
14hypothesis using probit regression.
Probability of Being Denied Credit
The central variable of interest in the empirical model is the bankruptcy exemption. We use
dummy variables to represent quartiles of the exemption distribution, with the lowest quartile being the
excluded category. A number of other factors are also likely to affect the probability that a household
gets turned down for credit or is discouraged from borrowing. The life-cycle hypothesis suggests that
younger households are more likely to borrow than older households. Consequently we include age
and age squared in the regression. Income affects households’ access to credit and may affect their
demand for credit, so income and income squared are included.” In a manner similar to income,
assets affect households’ access to credit and may also affect their demand, so we include the level of
total assets in our analysis. We use several additional variables to proxy for tastes: family size,
education of the household head, and dummy variables for whether the household head is married or
is nonwhite,
There may be geographic variation across credit markets that could spuriously influence our
exemption variables.25 We include the Herfmdahl index for financial institutions in the area as a crude
proxy variable for the competitiveness of the local lending market, and dummy variables indicating
whether branch banking was allowed state-wide and whether multi-bank holding companies were
prohibited in the state. We include the county unemployment rate in 1992, a dummy variable for rural
households, and three dummy variables for the region of the country (the west is the excluded
category) to account for potential geographic variation in credit markets.
24 For example, income tends to be positively correlated with tax rates. Households with high marginal
tax rates may find it profitable to borrow because the after-tax interest rate on borrowing is lower than the
after-tax rate of return on investments (recall that in 1983, interest on all loans was tax-deductible).
“One potential source of geographic variation in credit markets might be state usury laws, but they had
been abolished by 1983.
15We also include additional observable characteristics that enter the credit scoring finction used by
financial institutions. Following Boyes, Hoffman, and Low [1989], we include the mean income of
the profession of the household head (also see Cox and Jappelli [1993]) and years working at the
household head’s current employer.2b Descriptive statistics for the variables used in the analyses are
given in Appendix Table 1.
Table II shows the results of a probit regression examining the factors correlated with being
turned down for credit or discouraged from applying to borrow. Standard errors are computed using
Huber’s method [StataCorp 1995] to account for potential correlation in the error terms at the state
level. We find that the exemption variable for households in unlimited exemption states is positively
and significantly related to the probability of being turned down for credit or discouraged from
borrowing. This result is consistent with the descriptive evidence presented in Figure II. The fourth
column of the table shows the effect of a marginal change in a given covariate on the probability of
not receiving credit. It shows that the economic significance of the bankruptcy variable is substantial.
In the sample, 17.3 percent of households were denied credit or discouraged from borrowing. The
exemption variables suggest that the probabi Iity of being turned down for credit or discouraged from
borrowing is 5.5 percentage points higher in states with unlimited exemptions than in states in the
bottom quartile of the exemption distribution. The other two exemption dummies are not significantly
different from zero, but the point estimates show a roughly 2.7 percentage point difference.27
As expected, the magnitude of all the estimated exemption coefficients increases if the sample is
restricted to households with low assets. If we restrict the sample to households in the bottom half of
2’Boyes, Hoffman, and Low [1989] had access to confidential credit history information (especially
credit bureau reports) when estimating their score function of being turned down for a credit card,
27 The results are robust to a large number of alternative specifications and the inclusion of additional
geographic characteristics. Dropping the regional dummies increases the magnitude of the exemption
variables by roughly one percentage point, makes the second exemption dummy significant at the 7 percent
level, and the others significant at all usual levels of confidence.
16the asset distribution, the marginal effect for the unlimited exemption increases to 7.9 percentage
points. If we restrict the sample firther, to households in the bottom quarter of the asset distribution,
the marginal effect increases to 10.2 percentage points. It is statistically significant in each
specification. Thus, it appears that the bankruptcy exemption is




strongly correlated with the
borrowing, particularly for low-asset
estimates conform to intuition and previous empirical estimates (for
The probability of being denied credit or discouraged from applying falls
at an increasing rate with age and falls at a decreasing rate with income. The banking market
variables suggest that households are less likely to be turned down for credit or discouraged from
applying in more highly concentrated financial markets and states that prohibit multi-bank holding
companies. All the binary covariates are interpreted as the effect of switching the variable to one from
zero. The largest economic effects are that nonwhite households are 8,7 percentage points more likely
to be denied credit
relative to baseline
Household Debt2’
and married households are 5.7 percentage
characteristics evaluated at the mean.
points less likely to be denied credit,
We write households’ desired level of debt, D as
D = X~l + alE + Cl,
where E is the bankruptcy exemption in the household’s state of residence and X denotes a vector of
other factors influencing
may be turned down for
the demand for debt.
credit or discouraged
We do not observe D, however, because the household
from applying and therefore the observed level of debt,
28 The selection model of household debt is similar to Cox and Jappelli [1993] and Duca and Rosenthal
[1993]. Neither previous study examines the effect of bankruptcy exemptions on credit markets.
17D*, may be less than D. In addition, the distribution of D * is truncated at zero. Therefore, we




I;=l if D *>O
1:=0 otherwise,
where Ild distinguishes households that are not turned down or discouraged from applying for loans,
and Zzddistinguishes households with positive observed amounts of debt. We parametrize the
indicator functions using a bivariate probit model,
Zld= xTp T + &T
12d= Xzpz + Cz ,
where XT represents a vector of factors influencing the decision of banks to deny credit to applicants,
Xz represents a vector of factors affecting the incidence of positive debt, and E~ and Cz are
18distributed bivariate normal.z9
The empirical model of the demand for debt is
where, under the assumptions of normality, formulas for the two selection terns are straightforward
extensions of the usual Mill’s ratio in selection models, calculated from the bivariate probit model, and q ~
is a normally distributed error tern.
Because the distribution of household debt is highly skewed, we use the natural logarithm of total
household debt as the dependent variable in our primary specification. To account for potential
nonlinearities between the bankruptcy exemption and assets, we treat the combined bankruptcy
exemption as a continuous variable for states whose exemptions are not unlimited and interact this
exemption variable with asset quartile dummies, leading to four asset-exemption interaction variables
(where states with unlimited exemptions are coded as zeros). Because any specific coding of the
unlimited exemption states is arbitrary, we also add a second set of four variables that interact the
dummy variable for states with unlimited exemptions with the four asset quartile dummies. We also
include an age spline (defined in Appendix I) for the age of the household head to capture life-cycle
patterns in the use of debt, and a series of dummy variables measuring the educational attainment of
the household head (where the omitted category is no high school diploma). Otherwise the covariates
29Estimates for the bivariate probit model are given in Appendix Table II. The specification for the
denied or discouraged from borrowing portion of the model is identical to Table II, with the coding of the
dependent variable reversed. The covariates for having positive amounts of credit differ by dropping one
of the variables included as part of the bank’s credit scoring function (average income in the household
head’s profession) and by adding a dummy variable for “attitude toward credit.” The latter variable comes
from an SCF question that asks whether respondents think “it is a good idea or a bad idea for people to
buy things on the installment plan.” Three answers are possible: “good idea”, “good in some ways, bad in
others, ” and “bad idea.” We expect households answering the question that credit is a “bad idea” are less
likely to apply for credit and therefore more likely to have zero debt without ever having been turned down
for credit, making this a useful exclusion restriction.
19are the same as in the probit equation for positive debt.
Table III gives estimates for the amounts of debt held by households that were not denied credit
or discouraged from borrowing. As in Figure III, debt holdings are positively and significantly
correlated with the bankruptcy exemption for households in the top half of the asset distribution. The
effects are larger for almost all households in states with unlimited exemptions than similar households
in states without unlimited exemptions. This result is consistent with the hypothesis that increases in
the personal bankruptcy exemption increase demand for debt by high-asset households. The estimated
coefficient on the exemption for households in the bottom quartile of the asset distribution is negative
and significant, indicating that households with no or few assets hold less debt in high-exemption
states than observationally equivalent borrowers in low-exemption states. The mean effects are
considerably larger for households in states with unlimited exemptions. Thus, the evidence suggests
that the demand effect exceeds the supply effect for high-asset households in high-exemption states,
whi Ie the supply effect exceeds the demand effect for low-asset households in high-exemption states.
We find a life-cycle pattern of debt in which households under age 35 have higher levels of debt,
and debt declines almost monotonically for older households. Debt increases with education, income
(though at a decreasing rate), assets, being married, family size, and living in the west. Debt is
negatively related to the concentration of the financial market and the number of years that the
household head has worked at the current employer.
The selection term for the probability of being credit constrained is negative and significant. This
result implies that unobserved factors that increase the probability of being denied credit are negatively
correlated with the unobserved factors that affect credit demand. This selection result is similar to
Cox and Jappelli [1993].
Selection models of the type described above impose stringent distributional assumptions on the
error terms and, when violated, can generate misleading inferences [Goldberger, 1983]. To examine
20the robustness of our results, we also estimate the debt equation using median regression. This
alternative specification provides a usefil check for the sensitivity of our analysis to distributional
assumptions and outliers.30 The results are given in Table IV, where the dependent variable is defined
as the log of total household debt (adding $1 to total household debt to avoid taking the log of zero).
Standard errors are bootstrapped. The sign, size and significance of the central variables of interest –
the bankruptcy exemption interacted with assets – are consistent across the two specifications.31
In Table V we examine the economic significance of the coefficient estimates from the double
selection model of log debt. Our baseline household is defined as having the following characteristics:
gross assets of $100,000 (3rd quartile), 45 years old, coIlege degree, income of $75,000, married,
family size of four, white, male head of household, living in the midwest, 10 years of job tenure, and
living in an area with a county unemployment rate of 9.64 percent and a Hefilndahl index of financial
market concentration of 1.377. We estimate that this household would have $31,014 of debt in a state
with a combined bankruptcy exemption of $6,000 (such as Maryland or West Virginia). If the
household lived in a state with an exemption of $50,000 (roughly the size of California’s exemption),
we estimate that the household would have debt of $49,725. Other characteristics also have large
effects, particularly for households in high exemptions states. Thus, state bankruptcy exemptions
appear to have a substantial effect on households’ debt levels.
VII. Do Interest Rates Adjust?
Creditors may respond in a number of ways to the phenomenon of bankruptcy relative to a
situation where borrowers never default: raise interest rates, set higher minimum standards to quali~
for loans, increase collateral requirements, or screen loan applicants more vigorously. In this section
‘“The largest value of debt in our sample is $1,247,000.
3’The other covariates generally retain their patterns and significance, with the exception of the age
spline, assets, and several of the indicator variables.we examine whether households who live in states with higher bankruptcy exemptions pay higher
interest rates on loans than households who live in states with lower bankruptcy exemptions. Our
sample is households in the 1983 SCF who purchased new or used cars during 1982 or the first
quarter of 1983 and financed their purchases with loans, which gives us a homogeneous sample of
loans. We further limited our sample to households who obtained their loans from commercial banks,
savings and loans, or credit unions.32 This process yields a sample of310 households.
Because the sample consists only of households who purchased cars with credit, we estimate a
standard Heckit selection model.33 All other independent variables are defined as above, but we also
include quarterly dummy variables that allow for quarterly variation in the level of interest rates. The
exemption variables are defined exactly as in Tables III and IV.
Results for the interest rate model are presented in Table VI. Bankruptcy exemptions are
significantly and positively related to the interest rate for households in the two lowest asset quartiles.
In order to quanti~ the magnitude of the effects, we again use the baseline household defined in Table
V, with the exception that the household owns only $30,000 in assets, which would put it in the
second quartile of the asset distribution (effects are insignificant in the top two asset quartiles). In a
state with a $5,000 bankruptcy exemption, this household would pay an interest rate of 17.8 percent
on its car loan. In a state with a $50,000 exemption, the household would pay an interest rate of 20.1
percent, or 230 basis points higher. This 13 percent increase is well within the range of rates observed
32Weeliminated households who obtained credit from friends, dealers and automobile financing
companies, since interest rates on these loans clearly would reflect a host of other factors. For example, a
car dealer can offer a lower interest rate by adjusting the purchase price of the car.
331naddition to functional form, the selection model is identified using the attitudinal variable whether
the household thinks that it is a “good idea” to borrow. As before, households who think it is not a good
idea to borrow are less likely to be in the selected sample. The probit results are given in Appendix Table
111.
22in the sample during this high-interest-rate sample period.34
This result is consistent with the results found in previous sections of the paper. It appears that
low-asset households do not demand more debt in high exemption states, because they pay higher
interest rates than they would pay in low exemption states. However, high-asset households do not
pay significantly higher interest rates in high-exemption states than in low-exemption states, probably
because they have assets greater than the bankruptcy exemption
collateral .35
VIII. Conclusions
level or they offer lenders greater
In this paper we find a number of empirical results that are consistent with simple hypotheses
about the effects of the bankruptcy exemption on credit markets. We find that the size of the relevant
state’s bankruptcy exemption has a statistically and economically significant, positive effect on the
probability that potential borrowers in the state are denied credit or are discouraged from applying to
borrow. We also find that households in the lower half of the asset distribution have less debt and
face higher interest rates on car loans in states with high bankruptcy exemptions than borrowers in
low-exemption states, afier conditioning on observable characteristics. In contrast, households in the
upper half of the asset distribution have more credit in states with high bankruptcy exemptions,
suggesting that these households have higher credit demand that lenders are willing to accommodate.
Thus, while generous state-level bankruptcy exemptions would probably be viewed by most
34Mostother variables conform to expectations. Even controlling for differences in market structure,
some regional variation in interest rates remains, as households in the northeast face lower interest rates
than anywhere else in country. Interest rates varied considerably even during this short time frame of 15
months, reflecting the volatility of interest rates during the 1982-1983 sample period.
35Wealso ran a similar regression for the term to maturity of loans. The thought was that loans with
shorter terms to maturities would be considered “safer” by banks. Indeed, using the exact same model w
before we find that high bankruptcy exemptions appear to reduce the term to maturity by about 12 months
for low asset households. Again we find that car loans to high-asset households are not significantly
affected by changes in exemption levels. The results are available from the authors upon request.
23policymakers as benefiting less-well-off borrowers, our results suggest they increase the amount of
credit held by high-asset households and reduce the availability of credit to low-asset households, i.e.,
they redistribute credit toward borrowers with high resets.
Given the explosion in the number of personal bankruptcy filings (to roughly 900,000 in 1992,
from roughly 300,000 in 1983), we suspect that the empirical magnitudes documented in this paper are
conservative estimates of the current economic effects of personal bankruptcy exemption levels on
credit markets. Moreover, in 1994 Congress passed the National Bankruptcy Review Commission Act,
which, among other provisions, doubled the Federal personal bankruptcy exemption and, therefore,
increased the number of households who would benefit financially from filing for bankruptcy. Thus,
personal bankruptcy may become an even more important influence on credit markets in the future.
International Monetary Fund
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27Table I
State Bankruptcy Exemptions in 1983
State Home- Non- Use Fed. Doub. for Other provisions=




















































































































































if over 65, $30000 homestead
total exemption <$10000
if over 60, $60000 homestead
*d
$200 month for rent
business partnership exempt
$1000 if mobile home











































































































no homestead $7500 for couples
no *.
no *C
no pers. prop. incl. all clothes and
furn.
yes





Source: Individual state bankruptcy codes.
‘A “yes” means that a household may use the Federal exemptions if they are more generous.
bExemptions levels are doubled for married couples.
CMost states also allow exemptions for automobiles and life insurance. See Elias, Renauer, and Leonard
(1993) for additional detail on current exemptions.
‘If debts only by one spouse, homestead may be exempt
‘Car and insurance are included under the personal property exemption.
‘Can add $2000 for a spouse and $500 per dependent to the homestead exemption.Table II
Probability of Being Turned Down for Credit or Discouraged from Borrowin#







Age squared (in 10,000)
Education
Income (in $10,000)
Income squared (in $100,000,000)









Average income of household’s profession (in
$10,000)
Herfindahl index for financial institutions in the
area (in 1,000)
Years working at current employer
State-wide branch banking
No multi-bank holding companies in state
































































































Pseudo R’ = .1880
‘In the sample 642 households out of 3,706 repofi being turned down or discouraged from borrowing.
bSimulated derivative (evaluated at the means of the independent variables) is for a discrete change of the
dummy variable from O to 1Table III
Double Selection Model of Log Debt, Estimated with the Unconstrained Sample with Positive Debt.
VariabIe Coefficient Std. Error T-Statistic
Constant
Combined bankruptcy exemption (in $10,000) x dummy
variable for first quartile of the total asset distribution
Bankruptcy exemption x 2nd asset quartile dummy
Bankruptcy exemption x 3rd reset quartile dummy
Bankruptcy exemption x 4th asset quartile dummy
Unlimited bankruptcy exemption x 1st asset quartile dummy
Unlimited bankruptcy exemption x 2nd asset quartile dummy
Unlimited bankruptcy exemption x 3rd reset quartile dummy
Unlimited bankruptcy exemption x 4th reset quartile dummy





Age spline over 65
High school diploma dummy
Some college dummy
College degree or more dummy
Income (in $ 10,000)
Income squared (in $100,000,000)































































































0.23Herfrndahl index for financial institutions in area (in 1,000) -0.104 0.044 2.36
Years working at current employer -0.020 0.006 3.37
Dummy for “thinks credit is a bad idea” 0.023 0.113 0.20
State-wide branch banking -0,009 0.104 0.09
No multi-bank holding companies in state -0.022 0.131 0.17
County unemployment rate in 1982 x 10 0.001 0.001 0.57
Lambda-Unconstrained -1.544 0.614 2.51
Lambda-Positive Debt -0.245 0.591 0.41
Adjusted R’ = .434
Sample size = 2,118Table IV
Median Regression Estimates of hg Debt, with Bootstrapped Standard Errors
Variable Coefficient Std. Error T-Statistic
Constant
Combined bankruptcy exemption (in $10,000) x dummy
variable for first quartile of the total reset distribution
Bankruptcy exemption x 2nd reset quartile dummy
Bankruptcy exemption x 3rd asset quartile dummy
Bankruptcy exemption x 4th asset quartile dummy
Unlimited bankruptcy exemption x 1st asset quartile dummy
Unlimited bankruptcy exemption x 2nd asset quartile dummy
Unlimited bankruptcy exemption x 3rd asset quartile dummy
Unlimited bankruptcy exemption x 4th asset quartile dummy





Age spline over 65
High school diploma dummy
Some college dummy
College degree or more dummy
Income (in $10,000)
Income squared (in $100,000,000)































































































0.03Herfindahl index for financial institutions in area (in 1,000) -0.023 0.054 0.43
Years working at current employer 0.004 0.009 0.48
Dummy for “thitis credit is a bad idea” -0.361 0.124 2.92
State-wide branch banking -0.030 0.142 0.21
No multi-bank holding companies in state -0.240 0.171 1.40
County unemployment rate in 1982 x 10 0.001 0.001 0.78
Pseudo R2 = ,334
Sample size = 3,706Table V
Estimates of Median Total Debt Implied by the Double Selection Model of hg DebF
Median Total Debt




Assets = $47,000 (second quartile)




Years with Current Employer = 20
No High School Degree






















‘The baseline is defined as a household with gross assets of $100,000 (3rd quartile), 45 years old, college
degree, $75,000 income, married, family size of 4, white, male head of household, living in the Midwest, with
10 years on the current job, in an area with a Herfindahl index of financial market concentration of 1.377 and
county unemployment rate of 9.64 percent. The remaining rows of this table alter these characteristics.
bThe rows show the effect on total desired debt of altering the listed characteristic relative to the baseline
characteristics.Table VI
Selection Model of the Interest Rate Paid on Car Loans
Variable Coefficient Std. Emor T-statistic
Constant
Combined bankruptcy exemption (in $10,000) x dummy
variable for first quartile of the total asset distribution
Bankruptcy exemption x 2nd asset quartile dummy
Bankruptcy exemption x 3rd =set quartile dummy
Bankruptcy exemption x 4th asset quartile dummy
Unlimited bankruptcy exemption x 1st asset quartile dummy
Unlimited bankruptcy exemption x 2nd asset quartile dummy
Unlimited bankruptcy exemption x 3rd reset quartile dummy
Unlimited bankruptcy exemption x 4th asset quartile dummy
Age (in 100)
Age squared (in 10,000)
High school diploma dummy
Some college dummy
College degree or more dummy
Income (in $ 10,000)
Income squared (in $100,000,000)









Herfmdahl index for financial institutions in the area (in 1,000)





















































































0.95No multi-bank holding companies in state -0.251 0.871 0.29
County unemployment rate in 1983 x 10 -0.014 0.081 0.18
1982: first quarter dummy -0.346 1.400 0.25
1982: second quarter dummy -2.007 1.153 1.74
1982: third quarter dummy 0.907 1.201 0.76
1982: fourth quarter dummy -1.193 1.123 1.06
Lambda - Auto loan? -3.136 1.522 2.06
Adjusted R’ = .21
Sample size = 310Appendix I
Sample Statistics Tables II - VI, n = 3,706
Variable Mean Std. Dev. Minimum Maximum
Dummy variable for credit constrained
Natural log of total debt





Age squared (in 10,000)
Education
Income (in $10,000)
Income squared (in $100,000,000)









Average income of household’s profession (in
$10,000)
Herfindahl index for financial institutions in the
area (in 1,000)
Years working at current employer
State-wide branch banking
No multi-bank holding companies in state








































































































224.00Combined bankruptcy exemption (in $10,000) x
dummy variable for first quartile of the total asset
distribution
Bankruptcy exemption x 2nd asset quartile dummy
Bankruptcy exemption x 3rd asset quartile dummy
Bankruptcy exemption x 4th asset quartile dummy
Unlimited bankruptcy exemption x 1st asset
quartile dummy
Unlimited bankruptcy exemption x 2nd asset
quartile dummy
Unlimited bankruptcy exemption x 3rd asset
quartile dummy
Unlimited bankruptcy exemption x 4th asset
quartile dummy





Age spline over 65a
High school diploma dummy
Some college dummy
College degree or more dummy
Dummy for “thinks credit is a bad idea”













































































‘The age spline is defined in the following manner:
age 1 = age if age < 24; age 1 = 24 otherwise;
age2 = min(age-24, 1O) if age > 24; age2 = O otherwise;
age3 = min(age-34, 10) if age > 34; age3 = O otherwise;
age4 = min(age44, 10) if age > 44; age4 = O otherwise;
age5 = min(age-54, 1O) if age > 54; age5 = O otherwise;
age6 = age-64 if age > 64; age6 = O otherwise.Appendix H
Bivariate Probit Estimates for Double Selection Model in Table III
Variable Coefficient Std. Error T-Statistic






Age squared (in 10,000)
Education
Income (in $10,000)
Income squared (in $100,000,000)









Average income of household’s profession (in $10,000)
Herfindahl index for financial institutions in the area (in 1,000)
Years working at current employer
State-wide branch banking
No multi-bank holding companies in state

























Have Positive Amounts of Debt (2,599 out of 3,706)
Constant -0.767























































Age squared (in 10,000)
Education
Income (in $10,000)
Income squared (in $100,000,000)









Herfindahl index for financial institutions in the area (in 1,000)
Years working at current employer
Dummy for “thinks credit is a bad idea”
State-wide branch banking
No multi-bank holding companies in state
County unemployment rate in 1982 x 10






































































Log-likelihood = -3102.1Appendix III
Probit Estimates for Selection Model in Table VI
Variable Coefficient Std. Error T-statistic
Constant
Combined bankruptcy exemption (in $10,000) x dummy
variable for first quartile of the total asset distribution
Bankruptcy exemption x 2nd reset quartile dummy
Bankruptcy exemption x 3rd asset quartile dummy
Bankruptcy exemption x 4th asset quartile dummy
Unlimited bankruptcy exemption x 1st asset quartile dummy
Unlimited bankruptcy exemption x 2nd asset quartile dummy
Unlimited bankruptcy exemption x 3rd asset quartile dummy
Unlimited bankruptcy exemption x 4th asset quartile dummy
Age (in 100)
Age squared (in 10,000)
High school diploma dummy
Some college dummy
College degree or more dummy
Income (in $10,000)
Income squared (in $100,000,000)









Hertindahl index for financial institutions in the area (in 1,000)





















































































0.90No multi-bank holding companies in state -0.166 0.112 1.48
County unemployment rate in 1983 x 10 -0.020 0.010 1.94
1982: first quarter dummy 0.089 0.135 0.66
1982: second quarter dummy -0.072 0.110 0.65
1982: third quarter dummy 0.078 0.094 0.83
1982: fourth quarter dummy -0.071 0.088 0.81
Dummy for “thinks credit is a bad idea” -0.183 0.083 2.20
Log-1 ikelihood = -1816.9Figure I
The Relationship Between Wealth and Debt Repayment Under Bankruptcy
(a) Bankruptcy, (b) Bankruptcy, (C) No Bankruptcy,
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